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THE TENANT'S CONSENT TO AN ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCH
People v. Rosenthal, 59 Misc. 2d565, 299 N. Y.S.2d 960 (1969)
A city health inspector entered the defendant-absentee landlord's
apartment building Without a search warrant and made a routine
inspection of the building.' The inspector found violations of the
Minimum Housing Standards Ordinance in the ceiling of the bathroom
-)f a tenant who had consented to inspection of his apartment. The
defendant, indicted for violating the ordinance, moved to suppress the
evidence of the inspection on the grounds that the inspection was an
unreasonable search prohibited by the fourth amendment. Held:
defendant's motion granted. An absentee landlord has standing to
challenge use of the evidence gained by an administrative search of his
apartment building, and a warrantless search is not validated by the
consent of a tenant.2
Before determining whether the tenant's consent validated the
warrantless search, the court first had to consider whether the absentee
landlord had standing to object to the introduction of the evidence
secured by the search. Because the search was conducted against him
and the evidence was being offered against him, and because the
defendant, as landlord, had a personal property interest in the structure
of the apartment building, the court held that the defendant-landlord
did have standing to object.
To determine the validity of the tenant's consent to the search of his
apartment, the court attempted to analyze the propefty interests of the
tenant and the defendant-landlord in the leased premises. The court
noted that the ceiling of the tenant's bathroom "will presumably
survive the present tenancy. . . .[It] will remain the personal province
and responsibility of the defendant-landlord." ' In this rather awkward
I. People v. Rosenthal, 59 Misc.2d 565, 299 N.Y.S.2d 960 (City Ct. or Poughkeepsie 1969).
There is no indication in the case that the inspection was made pursuant to a complaint, so it is
assumed that the inspection was merely routine.
2. Id.
3. The evidence of the inspection was the physical condition of the ceiling of the tenant's
bathroom. It is not clear whether the court granted standing to the defendant because it felt that
his property interest was superior to that of the tenant's or because the property interest gave
the defendant a sufficient connection to the premises searched to object to the use of the evidence
of the search against him. For a complete discussion of the standing rules to object to the use of
evidence gained by unconstitutional searches and seizures, see Note, Standing to Object to all
Unlauful Search and Seizure, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 488.
4. People v. Rosenthal, 59 Misc. 2d 565, -, 299 N.Y.S.2d 960, 964 (City Ct. of
Poughkeepsie 1969).
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fashion, the court was apparently attempting to describe the defendant-
landlord's reversionary interest in the tenant's apartment. The court
did not describe the tenant's interest in the leased premises. The court
simply concluded that the tenant "cannot give a binding consent to a
search of the property personal to her landlord."5
The fourth amendment6 is designed to protect the individual from the
arbitrary exercise of governmental power.7 Searches and seizures are
not valid under the fourth amendment unless made pursuant to a
warrant issued by an authorized judicial officer based on a showing of
probable cause., There are, however, certain exceptions to the warrant
requirement. Thus, searches which are otherwise reasonable may be
made without a warrant as incident to: a valid arrest, an emergency
situation, or consent.9 Third party consent searches should be
distinguished from searches conducted incident to the consent of one
who ultimately becomes the defendant.' 0 The issue in third party
consent searches is whether an otherwise unconstitutional search is
made reasonable by the consent of a third party. To decide this issue
courts have usually analyzed the nature of the third party's property
interest in the premises searched. The general rule is that consent may
be validly given by one having a right to possession and control of the
premises searched."
5 1d The inspector in the Rownthal case had also noted violations of the Minimum Housing
Standards Ordinance in the walls of the common hallways of the apartment building. The
defendant was indicted for these violations as well as those found in the tenant's apartment. The
court foand that the search of the common hallways was also invalid, stating that "if a portion
of the iruwurc \ithm the leased premises the ceiling of the tenant's bathroom] can be attacked
by an abstentee-landlord, it follows, a fortori that common hallways must be treated in a similar
manner." Id at -, 299 N.Y S.2d at 964. The legality of the search of the tenant's apartment
depended upon the validity of the tenant's consent. The tenant did not consent to a search of the
common hallways. Apparently the inspector merely walked into the apartment building and noted
the violations in the common hallways either on the way to or from the tenant's apartment. It
does not follow from the invalidity of the consent search of the tenant's apartment that the
warrantless and consentless search of the common hallways was also invalid. See note 22, infra.
6 U S Co sT amend. IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.
7 1 J VNRON, SEARCHES, SEIZURES AND IMMUNITIES 5 (1961).
8 Id at 225.
9 Id at 225-26.
10 Set, Note, Third Party" Consent to Search and Seizure, 1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 12, 14
[hereinafter cited as Third Party Consent]. Consent to search should also be distinguished from
consent to enter. Id. at 18-19.
II Third Part, Consent at 21. It has been held that a landlord may not consent to a search
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Though only describing the property interest of the defendant-
landlord, the Rosenthal court did recognize his interest was not
possessory.12 The court, then, implicitly recognized the existence of some
property interest in the tenant. If, in fact, both the tenant and the
landlord have property interests in leased premises, it appears
appropriate that a court weigh these interests in considering the validity
of a tenant's consent to an administrative search of his apartment.
Except where a lease provides otherwise, landlord-tenant law
provides that the tenant acquires possession of the leased premises, and
all the rights which accompany ownership of a possessory interest, such
as the power to exclude. The landlord generally has no right to enter
or to control use of the leased premises.'3 Thus, the Rosenthal holding
cannot be supported on the basis of real property law.
It should be noted, however, that there are tests other than the
property test" which Rosenthal might have employed to determine the
validity of the tenant's consent to an administrative search of his
apartment. Several courts have analyzed the validity of warrantless
searches on the basis of the right of privacy. The right of privacy test
can be more accurately broken down into two separate tests: the
property-privacy test and the personal privacy test.
State v. Schaffel 6 demonstrates the property-privacy test. In that
of his tenant's premises when the landlord's sole right to possession and control depends upon
his status as landlord, e.g., his right to view the premises for waste. Id. Difficult problems may
arise, however, when the landlord reserves increasing amounts of control over the leased premises
through covenants in the lease.
12. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.38 (A. Casner ed. 1952). See generally Mintz, Search
of Premises by Consent, 73 DICK. L. REv. 44 (1968).
13. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.38 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
14. California courts have developed a hybrid property test to determine the validity of third
party consent searches. Generally stated, California courts look to the relationship of the
consenter to the premises searched not only to determine whether the consentee in fact had
possession and control, but also to determine whether the official conducting the search
reasonably believed that the consenter had possession and control. If the requisite relationship of
the consenter to the premises does not in fact exist, California courts may nevertheless uphold
the validity of the consent if they find that the official reasonably believed that the consenter had
possession and control. See Third Party Consent 32-34. It appears that the California rule would
validate more third party consents to administrative searches of apartments than would the
traditional property test, inasmuch as California courts would uphold searches made pursuant to
the consent of one who is not the tenant but reasonably appears to be in possession and control
of the apartment at the time of the consent. Id. at 34.
15. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523
(1967).
16. 4 Conn. Cir. 234, 229 A.2d 552 (App. Div. 1966), petition for certification for appeal
denied, 228 A.2d 560 (Conn. 1967).
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case, several of the defendant-landlord's tenants consented to a
warrantless administrative search of their apartments in which
violations of the New Haven Minimum Housing Standards Ordinance
were found. In rejecting the defendant-landlord's attack upon the use
of the evidence of the search, the court noted that it was a well-accepted
principle that the fourth amendment was designed to protect the right
of privac' against official invasion. The court stated, moreover, that
the right of possession and control of the premises searched forms the
basis of the right of privacy. The court found that, unless a lease
provides otherwise, a tenant acquires exclusive possession and control
of leased premises. The lease in Schaffel permitted the defendant-
landlord to enter the leased premises to inspect and to see that the
covenants on the part of the tenant are being kept and performed. The
court found that these terms of the lease gave the defendant-landlord
the right to enter for specific purposes only, but that this limited right
of entry was far from control inasmuch as the tenant retained the
general power to exclude.' 7 Because the tenants retained possession and
control of their leased premises, the court concluded that the tenants,
not the landlord, had the right of privacy in the premises searched.
Therefore, the tenants could validly consent to an invasion of the
privacy. "
Schaffel makes clear that the right of privacy depends upon or
evolves from property interests in the premises searched. t9 Thus, this
property-privacy test of the validity of a tenant's consent to an
administrative search of his apartment appears to be substantially the
same as the property test. And because the holding in Rosenthal cannot
be supported on the basis of the property test, it cannot be supported
by use of the property-privacy test.
17. Id at247,229A.2dat561.
18 Id at 250-51, 229 A.2d at 561-63. The inspectors in the Schaffel case had initially entered
the apartment building in response to the complaint of a tenant. Either before or after inspecting
the complaining tenant's apartment, the inspectors noted violations of the Minimum Housing
Standards Ordinance in the common hallways. The court allowed the evidence of the violations
in the common hallways to be introduced on the grounds that the complaining tenant's consent
extended to a search of the common hallways. The court noted that a tenant has exclusive
possession and control not only of the leased premises, but also, of parts of the structure which
form an integral part of the tenement, e.g., common hallways. Id. at 236-37, 229 A.2d at 561.
But .we People v. Corrao, 201 Cal. App. 2d 848, 20 Cal. Rptr. 492 (1962) (landlord retains control
over the common areas of leased premises).
19. State v. Schaffel, 4 Conn. Cir. 234, 229 A.2d 552 (App. Div. 1966), petition for
certi/fiation fur appeal denied, 228 A.2d 560 (Conn. 1967).
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In Katz v. United States,0 the Supreme Court held that the right of
privacy protected by the fourth amendment does not depend upon
property interests in the premises searched. In that case, the
government attempted to introduce evidence of the defendant's
telephone conversations, overheard by Federal Bureau of Investigation
agents who had attached an electronic device to the outside of the
public telephone booth from which the defendant had placed his calls.2
In rejecting the government's contention that no right of privacy of the
defendant was invaded by attaching the electronic device to the outside
of the public telephone booth because the defendant had no property
interest in a public telephone booth, the Court stated that:
[t]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not
a subject of Fourth Amendment protection . . . . But what he seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected. 2
Although the Katz decision did not concern a third party consent
search, the personal privacy test recognized by Katz emerges as a
possible alternative to determine the validity of a tenant's consent to
an administrative search of his apartment.23 Even assuming that the
personal privacy test is an appropriate test in third party consent
searches, it appears that use of this test in Rosenthal would have
validated the tenant's consent. The personal privacy protected by Katz
is a transitory right that the individual carries with him wherever he
goes to assure that whatever he seeks to keep private remains free from
unauthorized invasion. In Rosenthal, with no evidence of any property
interest reserved under the lease, the defendant-landlord's presence on
the premises when the search was conducted would be critical under
Katz. The landlord was not present, however, and the tenant who was
present chose not to keep anything secret. Thus, the Rosenthal decision
cannot be supported either under the test which it employed or under
the possible alternative tests which it might have used.
20. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
21. Id. at 348.
22. Id. at 351.
23. See Alderman v. United States, 89 S. Ct. 961, 968 (1969) (personal privacy and property-
privacy tests used in the alternative to test the constitutionality of warrantless search).
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